Also, I suspect that the cited chart is taken out of context. Industry data, from manufacturers and not specific to the NASA Space Launch System, indicate that the short circuit failure mode is due primarily to manufacturing defects and open circuit failure modes are primarily due to manufacturing defects and improper handling and installation. Whereas the change of operating parameters, C and ESR, are primarily caused by deterioration over time. Both C and ESR change slowly as electrolytic caps age. When relying on failure mode data, it is important to identify the point where the capacitor is considered failed. As the ESR changes over time, that change is likely audible well before the capacitor is determined to have failed for the data collectors.
You are correct about ESR. A new cap should have low ESR, meaning it passes an AC signal with very low losses, within its useable frequency range.
But you’re a tad off on the rest here.
That chart is just a sample; it’s for a tantalum electrolytic. The reference contains many types of capacitors, and includes aluminum electrolytics. The chart is based on many sources of data, from commercial, industrial, military, and manufacturers’ data. This particular chart is from RAC, Reliability Analysis Center, The Defense Technical Information Center, Rome Laboratory, Griffiss Air Force Base.
This reference, and others are used for suppliers and customers to calculate Reliability and Maintainability during preliminary design, critical design, and Design Critical review. It is used to form a part’s FMEA and FMECA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis; Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis). I don’t do the FMEA for avionics; I do the mechanical parts: TPS, umbilicals and explosives/pyrotechnics. Concepts are the same. NASA doesn’t build, they buy. Always been that way. Parts, systems, avionics, software have to be analyzed from concept to prototype in hand. All parts have to be analyzed to predict failure and modes. NASA uses these reference charts to predict failure rates, to look over the shoulder of suppliers who certify every part.
The avionics folks analyze every chip, diode, resistor, capacitor, inductor, discrete semiconductor, wiring board, connector, wiring harness, motherboard, back plane, and compare software response and redundancy.
I do that for every wire, pin, QD, seal, lever arm, solenoid, gas tube, hinge pin, tube connector in all 5 umbilical panels. Also for the initiator, flexible charge guide and shaped charge in the flight termination system and stage separation system/part.
In the real world, the actual failure rates line up well to calculations., in million hours between failures. Also, environment is factored in for failure rates.
The data for aluminum electrolytics looks like this:
